By Sophie Welsh
Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022 has transformed security policy debates in both Japan and Germany. On December 5, 2022, the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations invited two speakers—Masashi Murano (Hudson Institute) and Thomas Berger (Boston University)—to analyze and compare Japan’s and Germany’s current strategic thinking and future scenarios.
Mr. Murano began with Japan’s current security landscape, including threats from North Korea and the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the U.S. security policy documents have acknowledged the role of a power vacuum in Eastern Europe, which made it impossible for the U.S. to deter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Given resource constraints for the U.S., it continues to be impossible to return to the two-front war scenario in Eurasia against both China and Russia.
The current structure of Northeast Asian security has been shaped by the Korean War seventy years ago. One major difference today is that North Korea now has the option to prevent Japan from supporting the U.S. operations, either by preventing U.S. reinforcements from Japan or through psychological blackmail and physical obstruction against Japan. If North Korea deals its cards well, it may be able to force the U.S. into choosing between defending Tokyo and Seoul.
Mr. Murano envisions a number of possible crisis scenarios in Northeast Asia which would affect the U.S.-Japan alliance. First, there could be conventional missile strikes against underpopulated and non-urban areas, as warning shots, similar to the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Second, conventional strikes against U.S. or Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) bases, commercial airports, ports, and the like could take place. Third, there may be conventional strikes against civilian targets. Alternatively, there may be nuclear blackmail, demonstrating intent through nuclear explosions in places such as the Sea of Japan or Japan's Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ); or even an actual nuclear strike on land.
Mr. Murano points out the relative advantages and disadvantages of hypothetical conflict against North Korea and China. North Korea suffers from an inferiority in conventional forces (against the U.S.-ROK alliance), so it faces a relatively high possibility of escalatory action involving the use of nuclear weapons at an early stage of the conflict. On the other hand, China’s conventional forces would likely dominate those of the U.S.-Japan alliance, so it would have relatively low incentives to employ nuclear weapons. However, nuclear first-use incentives could arise for the U.S.
Prof. Thomas Berger spoke about the role of Germany in the context of the resurgence of power politics in Europe. Germany presents an interesting case, being small by some measures, but by EU standards, has been dominant in raw-power measures for a long time. It is significantly more powerful than the UK and France. He characterizes the country as “too big to be contained by Europe, but too small to dominate it.”
Germany’s foreign relations features four key elements. First, it practices “reflexive multilateralism, i.e., it wants to join all multilateral organizations, partly to appease public opinion and also to make itself accepted by its neighbors. Second, Germany has deep reluctance to use force though it has had more overseas combat missions in which roughly 120 troops have died. Third, on military affairs, it conceives of multilateral organizations as tools to engage adversaries. Fourth, more generally, the German policy has tried to engage potential enemies and keep an open dialogue, whether it was the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or Russia today.
According to Prof. Berger, Germany has been "sleepwalking" through the last decade, in terms of European security. Now we are seeing great power competition coming back: Ukraine and Russia are fighting an active military conflict, and there is tension across the Taiwan Strait. Germany is trying to respond, by increasing its defense spending while in an economic crisis, deploying weaponry to Ukraine, and enhancing its military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The German public understands the heightened security tensions in Eurasia, but it has little appetite for doing a lot more in military terms. And just as in the U.S., the German political parties are divided on the topic.
Prof. Berger suggests that Japan should think of the multilateral framework as an important device, which can shape domestic public opinion on security policies. The link between Asian and European security is growing. Europe also needs to cooperate with Japan in dealing with the Chinese challenge. Japan will also have to reach out to China, for deterrence as well as arms control.