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THE MILITARIZATION OF STATE BUILDING IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY EAST ASIA

by

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Introduction

Recent theoretical reexaminations of the nineteenth century, and encounters between ‘the West’ and ‘non-Western’ regions of the world, have prompted caution against “big bang” models of change in politics and history.¹ In their response to Buzan and Lawson, Musgrave and Nexon agree that the nineteenth century might be a more important watershed moment in world politics than the emergence of Westphalian sovereignty in 1648. At the same time, they caution against the potential “re-centering” of a different version of the “big bang” and instead urge careful attention to the specific political, economic, and social contexts in which European (and other) states were embedded.²

The significance of the late nineteenth century in the study of East Asian international relations is that this period serves as an important benchmark in the region-wide reconceptualization of sovereignty and state power. The conventional explanation of the rapid transformations in state practices, in realms of both domestic and foreign governance, is that they were prompted by Western gunboat diplomacy and other violent encounters. While acknowledging the important context of increasing external military competition in nineteenth century East Asia, I provide here a broader examination of the accelerating militarization of state

¹ On the view that a fundamental global transformation took place during the “long nineteenth century,” see Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “The Global Transformation: The Nineteenth Century and the Making of Modern International Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 3 (2013): 620-34; Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Recently, there has been a surge of scholarship on the significance of the nineteenth century for transforming international relations. See, for example, Jennifer Mitzen, *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013); Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014).

² Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, “Singularity or Aberration? A Response to Buzan and Lawson,” *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 3 (2013): 637-39.

and society, somewhat ironically, through the various “enlightenment” reforms, many of which were initiated by the Japanese government precisely to avoid wars with both Western powers and regional neighbors. This study also shows that the emergence of the modern state in East Asian countries such as Japan occurred through systematic rebuilding, rather than de novo creation, of the bureaucratic state, which predated—but continued to evolve through—the external interventions of the late nineteenth century.³

A key aspect of this state rebuilding was the centralization and systematic expansion of a Western-style modern police force. The police accounted for much of the increased size of the central and local state bureaucracy, and expanding the police force and its powers enhanced state capacity and sovereign authority. By the 1890s, Japan continued to expand its military and security apparatus—both domestic and overseas—as it occupied Taiwan and extended its influence in Korea. Even as Japan shied away from direct confrontation with Western powers, it continued to engage in military campaigns against indigenous peoples and other islanders in Taiwan and rural insurgents in Korea. While the existing literature tends to focus on Western “gunboat diplomacy” and external pressures driving the more traditionally visible interstate military conflict in East Asia (such as the Opium Wars, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Russo-Japanese War), I show how bureaucratic reforms and the increasing militarization of the state in Japan were responses to sustained two-front wars against both states and non-state actors. The police played a key role alongside the army in the increasing militarization of the state-building process, with consequences not only for Japanese society but also for regional security. More broadly, East Asian paths to state capacity building, evidenced in the process of military and

³ Similarly, Pär Cassel describes the coexistence of plural institutional logics and practices during the treaty port period. Pär Kristoffer Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

police reforms, varied according to the type and timing of internal, in addition to, external security threats.

In what follows, I describe the processes by which modernization of the police institution in Japan took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I characterize the ongoing transformations in terms of the consolidation and administrative reorganization of the modern police as central to state rebuilding and expansion. I then examine the multi-layered processes of police reform in the 1880s and 1890s as responses to both domestic political and external sources of change – including encounters and entanglements with western police forces (through visits and study trips to Europe for example), dealing with consular violence and armed insurgencies abroad, as well as internal financial constraints and social opposition.

Police-Building as State-Building in Nineteenth Century East Asia

Existing accounts of state building and militarization in nineteenth century Japan tend to adopt some version of the “rise of Japan” narrative, in which Japanese military modernization takes center stage. The focus of these studies is to explain outcomes such as the disruption in the systemic status quo or to detect early signals toward Japan’s expansionism. Typically, growing military expansionism in Japan is attributed to either the threatening strategic environment characterized by Western gunboat diplomacy or the increasing power of the military within the Japanese polity. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 looms large here, as it was the first major war fought by the modern Japanese military. But focusing on the balance of power between Meiji Japan and Qing China or unbalanced civil-military relations do not fully take into account the prevailing uncertainty and repeated failures of negotiated outcomes in East Asian

international relations before and after the war—indeed, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.⁴

In this sense, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 is better understood as part of a series of militarized crises that continue throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in a rapidly changing global strategic and institutional environment, characterized by: intensified strategic competition over East Asian territories among not only Japan and China but Western powers such as Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States; and heightened threat perceptions within East Asian countries as they attempted to adjust to the breakdown of existing diplomatic institutions and to manage the new rules of the game in “international society.” It was in many ways symptomatic of the distress and crisis that had built up in the existing regional order and led to enormous consequences for institutional change in the domestic and international systems, the politics of nation-state-building, and state socialization.⁵

Within this strategic context, Japan was navigating its precarious position as a disadvantaged newcomer to the rapidly-expanding system of nation-states. Unlike the other Western powers, Japanese commercial and strategic interests were incompatible with the old order, in which China and the Western powers had vested interests. As a latecomer to the preexisting environment of legal pluralism, Japan was confronted at once with Chinese defense and utilization of dualistic legal interpretations and Western reluctance to treat Japan as an equal nation-state.

⁴ It is worth noting that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was not a full-scale war between two fully mobilized nation-states. It was a limited war, fought between the Japanese army and navy on the one hand and Qing China’s regional force, the Beiyang Fleet. Unlike Japan, China did not yet have a centralized national land or sea force at the time, although the total sum of its various regional forces was larger.

⁵ Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and East Asian Modern* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999); Ayse Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Militarization in Japan took place as part and parcel of an urgent state rebuilding project. The establishment of a modern military, alongside a national police—and later a consular police network—and the various training schools, as well as the hiring of military attachés and foreign advisors, were not only attempts to increase the efficiency of governance in a rational bureaucratic state but also to signal state power and sovereignty authority to observers, outside and internal. During the Sino-Japanese War, for example, both Japan and China engaged in the battle over “civilization”—with the dual aim of demonstrating advanced culture and power to external (Western) observers and of mobilizing popular support for the purpose of internal state-building. Japanese leaders were not only determined to showcase the military efficiency and discipline of their army during the Sino-Japanese War, but also to impress upon Western observers their advanced “civilization.”⁶ Japanese wartime propaganda, photos, and illustrated magazines all emphasized the modernity of Japanese ships and uniforms as well as their civilized behavior. Recent research shows that a common theme in pictures of the Sino-Japanese War are “[c]oncepts of international law, including the conclusion of war treaties or the idea of the humanitarian treatment of the wounded that spread globally following the agreement of the Geneva Convention in 1864.”⁷ A recurring motif is the friendly care of Japanese soldiers towards Chinese children, and a number of publications emphasized Japan’s respect for international law throughout their war against China.⁸

⁶ Stewart Lone, *Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan: The Three Careers of General Katsura Tarō* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 30.

⁷ Judith Frölich, “Pictures of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895,” *War in History* 21, 2 (2014): 242.

⁸ Frölich, “Pictures of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895,” 243-47; Douglas Howland, “Japan’s Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895),” *Journal of the History of International Law* 9 (2007): 179-201; Douglas Howland, “The Sinking of the S.S. Kowshing: International Law, Diplomacy, and the Sino-Japanese War,” *Modern Asian Studies* 42, 4 (2008): 673-703.

Such “learning from the best” was also occurring in a moment of global isomorphism, whereby coercive apparatuses of colonial/imperial control were being strengthened worldwide.⁹ And, as reforms allowed the increased participation of formerly excluded regional elites—and later, ordinary citizens with demands for political, economic, and social change—centralization of state power and capacity building became even more necessary. In sum, police modernization took place in the context of state centralization and military modernization, as Japan entered the global hierarchy of nation-states. In other words, state capacity building and administrative enforcement became crucial ingredients for successful governance and global recognition as a strong state worthy of membership and equal treatment in the competitive international system. The Japanese government had two key audiences—international and domestic—to whom it must demonstrate modernity, civilization, and capable governance (such as the protection of foreigners in its own territory and of its citizens abroad). As Japan’s global engagements grew—in terms of both actual and anticipated interstate wars and low-intensity military conflicts throughout the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century—the size and role of the police continued to expand accordingly.

Creation of a Modern Police in Japan, 1874-1881

In Japan, a centralized and professionalized police force was created in the late nineteenth century.¹⁰ This development of a modern police system was motivated by a clear set of political

⁹ Mark Ravina, “Japanese State Making in Global Context,” in Richard Boyd and Tak-Wing Ngo, eds., *State Making in Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 35-52.

¹⁰ Vincent J. Hoffman, “The Development of Modern Police Agencies in the Republic of Korea and Japan: A Paradox,” *Police Studies* 5, 3 (September 1982): 3-16.

concerns regarding newly emerging risks and threats. By the late nineteenth century, security for East Asian states entailed not only national defense against external powers and their gunboats but also necessitated a reorganization of their security concepts and apparatuses.¹¹ One important priority for political leaders in Meiji Japan was to achieve “full” sovereignty over its borders by overturning the unequal treaties and eliminating extraterritoriality in the forcibly opened treaty ports.¹² To do this, the Japanese and Korean governments were required to demonstrate modern legal and police systems that allowed them to maintain internal order in a “civilized” manner. Over time, however, the role and primary audience of modern police functions turned inward—that is, strengthening and legitimating the state and its sense of security while guarding it against domestic political opponents, protesters and rioters.

Meiji Japan is a case where the government used the police, army, and schools consciously to foster a modern set of orientations toward the nation.¹³ The worldview of Japanese elites had changed dramatically since the late 1860s until the 1870s, owing in large part to the influx of Western Learning (*yōgaku*), led by reformers who had been part of state missions dispatched abroad to learn European institutions. The legitimacy of the regime was increasingly tied to the new slogan of *bunmei kaika* (civilization and enlightenment) and the building of a modern state. The Meiji leaders went to great lengths to accommodate the rules and norms of the

¹¹ On the reconfiguration and reinvention of East Asian states via institutional reforms in the late nineteenth century, see Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Kyung Moon Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894-1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).

¹² Many intellectuals and party activists continued to demonstrate against the unequal treaties signed with the Western powers and opposed their revisions in 1887 and 1889. See Stephen Vlastos, “Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 5: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 387-388; Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 114.

¹³ David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 198.

international system, pressing for the adoption of Westernized legal codes in order to demonstrate the civilized progress of Japan and to hasten the revision of unequal treaties.¹⁴ Attacks against foreigners were banned and violations were severely dealt with in order to prevent diplomatic incidents and the undermining of the government's stature in the international arena. The Meiji government also improved its system of law enforcement and embarked on an extensive propaganda campaign to inform the public that anti-foreign attacks were against "the laws of the world." Such strategies were calculated to consolidate the government's authority and prestige—both domestically and internationally.¹⁵

The ensuing security culture therefore correspondingly pivoted around notions of modernity and civilization; while struggling with domestic legitimacy and the maintenance of order at the same time. The Meiji government needed the police at home and viewed it as a vital instrument for creating a strong nation respected in the world. In addition to maintaining law and order, the police, along with schools, courts, and the military, would play a key role in embodying national ideals and instructing the people in the new political vision.¹⁶ "Speeches of police officials at the time are filled with words like 'spirit,' 'dedication,' and 'virtue.'"¹⁷

Japan's modern police system began in 1874, with the creation of the Keishichō (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Office), which formally led to the institutional separation of the police and the military in Japan.¹⁸ The establishment of a national administrative system for the police

¹⁴ Kenneth B. Pyle, "Meiji Conservatism," in *The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 5: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 688-90.

¹⁵ See Akira Iriye, "Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status," in *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 5: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 734-35.

¹⁶ Sugai, "The Japanese Police System," 2.

¹⁷ David H. Bayley, *Forces of Order: Policing Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 153.

¹⁸ Shuichi Sugai, "The Japanese Police System," in Robert E. Ward, ed., *Five Studies in Japanese Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957); Seung-hee Lee, "Geundae Ilbon gyeongchal ui teukjing gwa geu imiji:

directly and indirectly allowed the expansion of state power and state capacity via the following three processes: *centralization* of public safety institutions and personnel; *professionalization* of the police force; and *increase in size and scope* of police functions. First and foremost, Japan systematically consolidated and unified the institutions and personnel responsible for public safety nationwide. As in other feudal societies, policing functions in Tokugawa Japan had been conducted in a decentralized fashion. Public order was maintained by, and its effectiveness varied across, regional governance units.¹⁹ In 1872, with the return of eight young officials who had traveled to Europe to study their state institutions and security practices, the foundations were laid for the establishment of a central and unified police system in Japan. Jurisdiction over the police was moved to a newly created Home Ministry from the Justice Ministry, and “a clear formal distinction was made between the judicial and the administrative functions of the police, as in France.”²⁰ An autonomous metropolitan police for the capital city of Tokyo (Keishichō) was also modeled after the Paris prefectural police. In 1879, a second police mission was dispatched to Europe, and the resulting report in 1880 formed the basis for major changes in Japan’s police system. In 1881, a new position at the top of each prefectural police administration was created. The Keibuchō was “the first prefectural police official to be appointed directly by the central government, and the “creation of this position strengthened the

Meiji siki reul jungshim euro” [The Characteristics and Image of the Modern Police in Japan during the Meiji Period], *Ilbonhak* [Japan Studies] 33 (2011): 225-45.

¹⁹ Bayley, *Patterns of Policing*, 24-49.

²⁰ D. Eleanor Westney, *Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 40. For an alternative account that emphasizes other foreign, especially British, influences, see Naoyuki Umemori, “Modernization Through Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2002. For a similar dissenting view in terms of external models for Japan’s prison reforms in the late nineteenth century, see Daniel V. Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).

power of the Home Ministry over the prefectural police, provided the mechanism for enforcing standardization, raised the status of the prefectural police within the prefectural administrative hierarchy, and created a national police career ladder.”²¹

By 1900, the capacities of the police were even more clearly defined and consolidated under an executive law, which placed the general control of all police matters under the Naimushō (Ministry of the Interior). In every prefecture, with the exception of Tokyo which had its own independent police unit, police affairs were conducted by the Keisatsubu (local police office), composed of *keishi* (police inspector), *keibu* (police sergeants), and *junsa* (constables), all led by a Chief Constable. A police station then was placed in every county or district, with several branch offices and stations throughout.²² The Interior Ministry also used the Tokyo Keishichō as an organizational model for the prefectural police, “as the prototype in which to construct the control system and the regulations for what was in effect a standardized national police force.”²³

Another characteristic of Japanese police modernization was the emphasis on professionalization of the police force. In the case of Meiji Japan, the powers of the police agencies were more clearly outlined by the Meiji Constitution of 1889 and other subsequent legislation. According to these constitutional provisions, “the Emperor, the Home Ministry, the Metropolitan Police Board and prefectural governors were enabled to, and did in fact, issue

²¹ Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, 71-72.

²² Kanetake Ōura, “The Police of Japan,” in Shigenobu Ōkuma, ed., *Kaikoku gojūnen shi* [Fifty Years of New Japan], 281-295 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1909).

²³ D. Eleanor Westney, “The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan: The Case of the Paris Prefecture of Police and the Keishi-chō,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 8, 2 (Summer 1982): 338.

numerous ordinances for police purposes, which were accompanied by the necessary penalty provision against their violation, and which had the force of law.”²⁴

The police also added careful and competitive recruitment procedures and significant training periods, which increased their effectiveness. The early recruits for the modern Japanese police were usually unemployed *samurai*, who brought with them “a system of morality peculiar to the former warrior class.”²⁵ At the same time, special care was taken to prohibit the old prerogatives and lifestyles of the *samurai* “in order to create a strong and pervasive organizational identity to replace [their] personal status.”²⁶ One evidence of such high value placed on specialized knowledge and the developing sense of professional identity is the emergence of a professional literature. As Westney argues: “In the 1880s the Police Bureau collected and published the lectures given at the national academy [...] Perhaps even more significant were the journals which emerged in the 1890s: a one-hundred-page monthly from a major commercial press, and the long-lived *Keisatsu no Me* (The Eyes of the Police), founded in 1892. These journals carried news of police cases, features on police organization in Japan and in Europe, stories on the major figures of the police hierarchy, and features on police procedure and changes in regulations.”²⁷ Additionally, in 1900, a national Police Association (*Keisatsu Kyōkai*), whose membership included all police officers at each level, was established. Its “aims were to encourage the advancement of knowledge and expertise in Japan’s police system and to act as a welfare organization for its membership.”²⁸

²⁴ Shuichi Sugai, “The Japanese Police System,” 3; Ōura, “The Police of Japan.”

²⁵ Sugai, “The Japanese Police System,” 4.

²⁶ Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, 39.

²⁷ Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, 86-87.

²⁸ Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, 87.

Increasing professionalization appears to have yielded results. As Sugai notes: “In 1877, three years after the initiation of the Metropolitan Police Board, a brigade of its forces contributed greatly in quelling the Saigo Rebellion in Kyushu. In 1887, ten years later, the police were used effectively to expel in less than three days 570 anti-government politicians from within a seven-mile radius of Tokyo City.”²⁹ By the turn of the century, in the face of increasing protests and radical social movements, the Japanese police used a number of administrative techniques to maintain public order, whereas many Western countries regulated political organization and publications through the courts.³⁰ For example, the Interior Ministry created new units such as the *kempeitai* (military police) and *kōtō* (high police), which were responsible for more specialized functions.³¹ After World War I, the Keishicho expanded rapidly to account for the dramatic population increase in Tokyo and fear of popular riots and labor strikes, for example (see Table 1).³² After 1925, the police were also very efficient in enforcing the Peace Preservation Law to suppress popular riots and subversive political movements.

A third noteworthy characteristic of the modernization of the Japanese police institution was the gradual but significant increase in the size and scope of their functions. Noticeably, they took on new administrative (in addition to preventive or punitive) duties, such as census-taking and maintaining public sanitation, that are characteristic of the bureaucratic state. These additional administrative roles also necessitated the bureaucratic expansion of the state, thereby

²⁹ Sugai, “The Japanese Police System,” 4.

³⁰ L. Craig Parker, *The Japanese Police System Today: A Comparative Study* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 27.

³¹ Ōura, “The Police of Japan,” 286.

³² Hee-jung Yun, “Geundae Ilbon ui gyeongchal jujuk e gwan han yeoksajeok gochal: 1860-1945” [Historical Review of the Police Organization in Modern Japan between 1860 and 1945], *Gyeongchalhak nonchong* [Police Studies Review] 4, 1 (2009): 155-77.

strengthening state capacity.³³ The Japanese modern police developed through centralizing reforms as a symbol of “civilization and enlightenment” during a time of rapid Westernization, motivated by the desire to abolish extraterritoriality and obtain equal status with Western powers.³⁴ In 1874, Kawaji Toshiyoshi, the first chief of the Keishichō, proclaimed that one of the central functions of the police was to guide and enlighten the Japanese people in the as yet unfamiliar ways of civilization and enlightenment. Under his guidance, the Keishichō published illustrated books and pamphlets “to educate the public in the new laws and regulations” and “assumed the responsibility for disseminating information about public health regulations.”³⁵

Indeed, the Japanese police began to take on state-building administrative duties in addition to their regular tasks of maintaining public order throughout the empire. As summarized by Elise Tipton: “In line with continental European usage tracing back to the *Polizeistaat*, the Meiji founders employed the term ‘police’ in the broad seventeenth and eighteenth-century sense of all internal administration rather than the narrow sense of crime prevention and detection, as adopted by the British and Americans. Consequently, the range of police activities was wide, as indicated by names of the major branches of the police: sanitation and health, traffic, firefighting, public morals, peace preservation.”³⁶ The Keishichō, in particular, “emulated the broad range of functions performed by the Paris police, including the enforcement of public health regulations;

³³ On the increasing “social management” and regulative capacities of various state organizations in post-Meiji Restoration Japan, see Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

³⁴ Daniel Botsman argues that Japan’s prison and penal code reforms took place in this same context—that is, the need to demonstrate to Western powers the modernity, and thus comparability, of Japan’s police, courts, prisons, army, and constitutional government. See Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan*, 5-7, 148.

³⁵ Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, 54.

³⁶ Elise K. Tipton, *The Japanese Police State: The Tokkō in Interwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 33-39. See also Richard H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976).

the licensing and regulation of prostitution; the supervision of a wide range of commercial activities such as pawnshops, second-hand shops, theaters, inns, the sale of ‘dangerous materials’ such as gunpowder, swords, and firearms; the carrying out of regular population counts; the surveillance of ‘dangerous’ individuals; the enforcement of press supervision; and the supervision of public morals.”³⁷ The outbreak of cholera in 1877 further allowed the intervention of the police into daily lives of the public, combining security with safety programs.³⁸ “In choosing the Paris model, therefore, the Japanese government selected a model in which policing functions were not clearly differentiated from local administrative and military functions.”³⁹

Wars, Insurgencies, and the Expansion of the Modern Police, 1882-1905

Beyond its initial creation, the modern institutional structure of the Japanese police continued to develop and evolve in response to both external and domestic challenges and constraints. First of all, institutional change occurred in a piecemeal manner, often utilizing preexisting personnel and practices. That is, western models were studied, ideas and practices were brought back home, but were not directly or uniformly adopted; reforms, especially in the early stages, involved extending or repurposing preexisting domestic institutions. Second, the pace and character of reform depended on several internal and external factors, including political leadership, domestic factional struggles, and intra-regional security and economic conflicts.

³⁷ Westney, “The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan,” 315.

³⁸ Seung-hee Lee, “Geundae Ilbon gyeongchal ui teukjing gwa geu imiji: Meiji sigi reul jungshim euro” [The Characteristics and Image of the Modern Police in Japan during the Meiji Period], *Ilbonhak* [Japan Studies] 33 (2011): 225-245.

³⁹ Westney, “The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan,” 316.

In the case of Japan, the evidence of French influence in the structure of the Tokyo metropolitan police (Keishichō) and the type of policing system is clear. But less examined is the role of other, earlier models for the Japanese police. One early (and non-French) model for the modern Japanese police was the open port police. The very first Western-style specialized police system was established in Yokohama, not in Tokyo, although it was the capital which faced the most acute problems of preserving order. The policing of foreign settlements, the largest one in Yokohama, had been conducted by a composite of English, French, and Japanese troops under an English commander. Even after 1868, however, “the new all-Japanese force naturally emulated the patterns that had become familiar to its members. English-style patrols, drills, ranks, functions, and armaments were employed.”⁴⁰ The Yokohama police also “provided an important model for the first Western-style police in Tokyo, the *rasotsu* system, formally set up in December of 1871. Indeed, in May 1872, the emulation of the Yokohama model extended to the adoption of the Yokohama police regulations by the Tokyo force virtually in toto.”⁴¹ Here, imperial encounters with western police forces did not wipe out original, and earlier Japanese models – the different ideas and practices, indigenous and exogenous ones, were combined to make fit for a modernizing empire.

It is noteworthy here that prior to the dispatch of the Kawaji mission to Europe in September 1872, Ishida Eikichi, the Superintendent of the Kanagawa Prefecture Police, traveled to Shanghai and Hong Kong in order to study the British colonial police system in May-September 1872.⁴² While the French influence on the Keishichō is undeniable, the “civilizing”

⁴⁰ Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, 38.

⁴¹ Westney, “The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan,” 310.

⁴² Umemori, “Modernization Through Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan,” 59-69.

mission of the British colonial police served as an alternative model for not only the treaty port police in Japan but would later diffuse into neighboring territories of Korea, Taiwan, and China in the form of consular police forces. These quasi-colonial police forces, maintained by Japan's Foreign Ministry, expanded rapidly throughout the Korean peninsula in the 1880s, following the opening of several treaty ports in Korea, and especially following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.⁴³

Another set of institutions that served as models for the Keishichō are quasi-modern police structures, such as the *hannin* and *rasotsu*, which operated during the early years of the new Meiji government. Following the administrative reforms of the new Meiji government replacing all *han*, the fiefdoms over which the samurai ruled, disgruntled samurai continued to attack British and other foreign citizens. This necessitated the establishment of a Western-style police organization to replace the *hannin*, who were lower-class samurai responsible for order maintenance in local communities.⁴⁴ In October 1871, the Meiji government abolished the existing *han*-based military forces, whose duties included policing of their respective domains, and established the *rasotsu*. In reality, the *hannin* and the *rasotsu* were still in charge of local community policing even after the Meiji Restoration, and it was not until 1875 that the *hannin/rasotsu* class was abolished and renamed the *junsu*. In fact, the vast majority of the Keishichō was constituted by personnel from the *rasotsu* system. As a predecessor to both the *rasotsu* and the Keishichō, the samurai bureaucracy of the Edo period provided early socialization to the first cohort of the modern police in Japan.⁴⁵

⁴³ Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 13-35.

⁴⁴ Yun, "Geundae Ilbon ui gyeongchal jojik e gwan han yeoksajeok gochal," 157-58.

⁴⁵ Eleanor Westney, for example, attributes the distinctive emphasis on public education by the Keishichō to the samurai legacy. Westney, "The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan," 320.

Subsequent police professionalization in Japan also had external *and* internal influences. One of the most powerful models for the Keishichō was provided by the Japanese army. During the Keishichō's early development, many top-ranking officials were recruited from the army. According to Westney, the "influence of the military model on the Keishichō was apparent from its inception. The uniforms selected were of a deliberately military cut and were issued for all ranks of police from the Chief Superintendent down. Thus the Keishichō was a uniformed organization, in contrast with the Paris police where upper-ranking officers and administrators wore plain clothes."⁴⁶ In addition, military drills were standard procedure among the Japanese police, and training schools for patrolmen (Keikan Renshūjo) were established in 1880 to provide training in law and procedure for members of the Keishichō and other police. Significantly, this type of organized specialized formal training for police officials predated French (and any other European) practice.⁴⁷ If anything, this military influence resembles the imperial Prussian model, which was a key feature of the second stage of Japanese political reforms in general. While early institutions, such as the Penal Code of 1880 and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1890, drew their influence from the French, the later Meiji legal, political, and social reforms, it appears, tended to reflect the Prussian (German) model.⁴⁸

The acceleration and intensity of reforms in the 1880s and the 1890s can be attributed to two factors: domestic political leadership and changing regional security conditions emanating from the new situation of imperial expansion. The first chief of the Keishichō was the former samurai-turned-*rasotsu* Kawaji Toshiyoshi, who had authored the first study-abroad mission

⁴⁶ Westney, "The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan," 322.

⁴⁷ Westney, "The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan," 323-24.

⁴⁸ Parker, *The Japanese Police System Today*, 12.

report in 1872 and became subsequently known as ‘the father of the Japanese police.’” In 1879, Kawaji led a second police mission to Europe and recommended additional steps in the consolidation of the Japanese police system. Kawaji’s instinct for centralization and standardization was reinforced under Yamagata Aritomo’s leadership. Yamagata was the Interior Minister in the 1883-1890 period, and it was he who first proposed the establishment of the police training schools in all prefectures based on the military academy model. Throughout the 1880s, Yamagata brought in German advisors to train the Japanese army and the police, and he continued to push for the extension of police stations to the countryside.⁴⁹ For example, the number of police posts nationwide “increased from 3,068 in 1885 to 11,357 five years later, and the ubiquitous presence of police boxes in village centers as well as urban intersections dates from these years.”⁵⁰ The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 added to the urgency of a professional and capable military and police.

A key consequence of Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War was that it became a stakeholder in the Westphalian territorial model of organizing nation-states. Japan was able to renegotiate its unequal treaties, and gained international prestige and standing. Yet, the Triple Intervention also confirmed the existence of a global status hierarchy, and Japan’s (and East Asia’s) place in it. And this global hierarchy had military, legal, economic, and racial dimensions,⁵¹ and “Japanese leaders often felt compelled by geostrategic considerations to

⁴⁹ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 323-324. See also Westney, *Imitation and Innovation*, 74-87.

⁵⁰ Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 401.

⁵¹ Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 95-96; Edward Keene, “The Standard of ‘Civilization,’ the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-century International Social Space,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42, 3 (2014): 651-73; Buzan and Lawson, *The Global Transformation*. On the role of race in interstate conflict and cooperation—specifically, in threat perceptions and propensity toward militarized conflict against “others,” see Zoltán I. Búzás, “The Color of Threat: Race, Threat Perception, and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923),” *Security Studies* 22, 4 (2013): 573-606. He argues: “Racial difference predisposes

extend or consolidate territorial sovereignty in order to protect Japan's flanks, under time pressure and with finite resources."⁵²

Following the Sino-Japanese War, Japan continued to accommodate Western powers and avoid confrontation with China and Russia in Korea. In addition, Japan helped train and modernize the Chinese army after 1897, while avoiding too close of an "alliance" with China and backing down on diplomatic conflict over Japanese immigration to Hawaii for fear of Western military intervention. At the same time, Japan continued to expand its military and security apparatus—both domestic and overseas—as it occupied Taiwan and extended its influence in Korea.⁵³ As Japan monitored and shied away from confrontation with Western powers, it continued to engage in military campaigns, with the help of intermediaries and other non-state actors such as legal advisors, mercenaries, bandits, and local chieftains, against indigenous peoples and other islanders in Taiwan and rural insurgents in Korea.⁵⁴

Taiwan

Between 1895 and 1902, Japan was involved in a military campaign to subjugate Taiwan. When Japanese troops landed on Taiwan on March 25, 1895, they faced a sustained armed resistance for the next eight months. Even though Li Hongzhang had ordered Chinese forces in

state toward discord, but it does not make interracial cooperation impossible. When more than two racially different agents interact, one is more likely to cooperate with the less threatening racial other....Although racial difference did not prevent the German-Japanese alliance, it caused friction between the allies, decreased popular support for the alliance, and contributed to making it a 'hollow alliance' that involved little cooperation" (583).

⁵² Paul D. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's 'Savage Border,' 1874-1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 17.

⁵³ Between 1895 and 1914, Japan acquired Taiwan, Karafuto (southern Sakhalin, 1905), the Guandong Leased Territory on the Liaoning Peninsula (1905), Korea (1910), and former German possessions in Micronesia.

⁵⁴ Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire*; Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014).

Taiwan not to resist, local guerrilla groups continued to fight against the Japanese occupiers. The Japanese established a new Governor-general office (Sōtokufu) in Taipei on June 2, 1895, and began a punitive expedition against the rebel strongholds. Even though the Japanese government declared victory in October, counterinsurgency operations continued until March 1896. Almost 50,000 troops and 26,000 civilian contractors were dispatched to quell the rebellion, and about 700 Japanese troops were killed or wounded, while another 20,000 casualties resulted from epidemic disease.⁵⁵ Armed resistance continued from the islanders, however. According to at least one account, in the period 1895-1902, there were reportedly attacks on 54 Japanese installations and 94 incidents staged by local armed resistance groups.⁵⁶ Estimates indicate that about 12,000 “bandit-rebels” were killed between 1898 and 1902, and over 32,000 “bandit-rebels” (about 1 percent of Taiwan’s total population) perished between 1895 and 1902. Another 6,744 men and women were convicted as “bandits,” and 4,610 (almost 70%) were executed between 1895 and 1906.⁵⁷ Even after 1902, successive Governor-generals witnessed at least six additional insurrections between 1907 and 1915, resulting in more casualties, including more than 800 executions.⁵⁸

In its decade-long “pacification” attempts, the Japanese Governor-general relied on both the military and police. In June 1897, Nogi Maresuke, Taiwan’s third Governor-general,

⁵⁵ Edward J. Drea, *Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 91; Chushichi Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825-1995* (Oxford University Press, 2000), 131.

⁵⁶ Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: the Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *Taiwan: A New History* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 207-08.

⁵⁷ Paul R. Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 54.

⁵⁸ Lamley, “Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945,” 211.

implemented a triple-guard system in which army units, assisted by military police, were dispatched to mountainous highland regions; military and civil police forces were assigned to lowland areas where there was still active resistance; and the civil police safeguarded more orderly rural and urban localities.⁵⁹ With limited progress in sight, the new Governor-general Kodama Gentarō and Chief of Civil Administration Gotō Shimpei, in February 1898, delegated to the police the primary responsibility for maintaining order throughout the island. As a result, an elaborate network of police stations were set up throughout Taiwan, and local Taiwanese were recruited to become members of the police force, although most of the leadership positions were reserved for high-ranking Japanese police officers.⁶⁰

A few months later, Kodama and Gotō also introduced the Community Policing Law, a revision of the late imperial Chinese community policing system (*baojia*). This refashioned community policing (*hokō*) system had as its most basic unit a *kō*, composed of ten households. Ten *kō* formed a *hō*, with the head of the *hō* (*hōsei*) in charge of each *kō* headperson (*kōchō*). Each *hōsei* in turn was under the purview of the highest-ranking member in the local office of the colonial police. The community police not only helped to enforce the law, they kept track of the household registration system, collected taxes, implemented public health and agricultural policies, and selected able-bodied residents to serve as porters. Men between the ages of seventeen and forty from each group in the *hokō* system were also organized into regional militias (*sōteidan*) for various contingencies, such as bandits and natural disasters.⁶¹ In this way, the *hokō* system essentially functioned as an auxiliary arm of the civil police force. Following the

⁵⁹ Lamley, "Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945," 207.

⁶⁰ Lamley, "Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945," 211-215; Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red*, 34-44.

⁶¹ Lamley, "Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945," 213-215; Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red*, 40-41.

creation of local jurisdictions in 1909, more *hokō* offices were established throughout the colony, often located in or nearby police stations and substations. By 1915, “the *hokō* system had become an integral part of the local police network.”⁶²

Korea

In Joseon Korea, the Japanese police extended its presence via the consular police, which was created by Japan’s Foreign Ministry initially to protect Japanese settlers and their property in the newly opened treaty ports in Busan—and later, Mokpo, Jinnampo, and Masan. The 1880s was a period of sustained partial and aborted reforms in Korea, leading to a number of coups, counter-coups, riots, and armed rebellions—the largest of which was the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894. It was in this context that the Japanese consular police—and the army—became increasingly involved in Korean domestic politics and economic policy.

Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the population of Japanese residents in Korean port cities grew rapidly, and the number of consular police in Korea between 1894 and 1899 grew from 52 to 134, or roughly by 250 percent.⁶³ During this period of expansion, the Japanese consular police also established police boxes (*hashutsujo*) and police substations (*chūzaijo*) in remote areas of the peninsula, similar to those created throughout Japan in the previous decade. Such consular police outposts often followed and supported the activities and demands of Japanese merchants, business owners, farmers, and other settlers whose commercial interests and economic influence began to penetrate Korea.⁶⁴

⁶² Lamley, “Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945,” 214.

⁶³ Erik Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire’s Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 24.

⁶⁴ Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire’s Edge*, 24-25.

During the Sino-Japanese War, the consular police also played a key role in advising the Korean government as the latter began establishing and training a centralized national police force (Gyeongmucheong). Led by the Japanese Home Ministry police official Takehisa Katsuzō, an expeditionary police force comprised of Japan's Home Ministry police bureau officers arrived in Seoul in October 1894.⁶⁵ During the Gabo Reforms of 1895, the Gyeongmucheong invited and formalized the role of Japanese police advisors in building a modern police force in Korea. This had the effect of setting a precedent for increasing advising roles by Japanese administrative officials in the future, eventually leading to Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910.⁶⁶ The Japanese government became even more active in Korea after 1895, helping to create a Japanese-trained military force (*hullyeondae*) of about 800 men to offset the influence of American and Russian advisors.⁶⁷

Japan's consular police in Korea underwent a second major expansion after 1895, with plans underway for the construction of a railway line connecting Seoul and Busan and due to increasing Japanese concerns about Russian influence in Korea and northeast Asia. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the consular police played a significant role in army reconnaissance missions. Due to their unrivaled language skills, cultivated in the police officer language-training programs in the Korean consulates since the 1880s, "dozens of local Gaimushō

⁶⁵ Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 25-26.

⁶⁶ Hyeong-jung Kim, *Han'guk gyeongchalsa* [History of the Korean Police] (Seoul: Bakyeongsa, 2016). See also Tae-jeong Jeong, "Uri nara gyeongchal hyeongseong gwa baljeon e gwan han yeon'gu" [The Creation and Development of the Police in Korea], Master's Thesis, Dong Ui University, 2013, 841-42.

⁶⁷ Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army*, 91; Carter Eckert, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism, 1866-1945* (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 40.

[Foreign Ministry] police officers were enlisted by the army to serve as interpreters on the battle front and in occupied territories.”⁶⁸

By 1904, Japanese advisors began to take over major governance functions related to finance and foreign affairs in Korea. Also included was the matter of policing. The Japanese proceeded with urgency especially following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. In 1905, the Japanese government dispatched a financial advisor and a police advisor to each of Korea’s 13 provinces. Eventually, many former consular police became a part of the colonial police system in 1905, and many other consular police veterans would help train colonial police officers after 1910.⁶⁹ After the Hague incident in 1907, the Japanese took over the Korean police entirely, subsuming it into their imperial infrastructure, and renaming the Gyeongmuchoong to Gyeongseichoong. The Japanese also increased the number of military police, who were deployed to quell various popular resistance movements throughout Korea. In 1909, Korean prosecution and penal systems were handed over the Japanese and all police functions came under Japanese control in June 1910.⁷⁰ Korean security was reduced to Japanese imperial functionalities and *raison d’état*; the Korean and Japanese imperial entanglements gave way to one-way traffic.

Conclusion

This paper contributes to the literature on the globalization of security practices and state-building in at least two specific ways: first, by expanding the scope of both empirical and theoretical examination of existing genealogies of security vocabularies and practices to East

⁶⁸ Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire’s Edge*, 30.

⁶⁹ Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire’s Edge*, 37.

⁷⁰ Son, “Gabo gaehyeok ihu geundaejeok gyeongchal jedo ui jeongrip gwa unyeong,” 381-382. See also Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea*.

Asia; and second, by exploring the various processes (such as learning, adaptation, collaboration, contestation, and combination) by which systematic reform and expansion of the modern police apparatus took place in the regional and global context of state and empire-building. Japanese police reforms, and their expansion, occurred in response to various domestic and international political contingencies. As a newly-emerging nation-state, the Japanese government introduced modern legal and penal codes as well as outlawing arbitrary punishment and excessive brutality, as part of its “civilizing” mission.⁷¹ Its military and police modernization processes were also plagued by financial constraints and internal dissent. In this sense, we should not overstate the nineteenth century origins of the Japanese military’s aggressively expansionist aims in support of the view that the rise in status of the military led to an unfettered and inevitable path toward imperialism.

Two key findings emerge from this analysis. First, expanding the police force and its powers enhanced state capacity as well as sovereign authority and national security. In practice, however, the change was more gradual and took place via hybrid models of administration, including the coexistence of parallel bureaucracies and repurposing of existing institutions. Second, police reform took place in several stages, and often suffered setbacks, in the political context of both external and internal security challenges and imperial encounters—that is, foreign domination and popular resistance to newly emerging institutions and policies.

One discernible pattern is that there was no single model for police modernization and reform in late nineteenth century East Asia. Japanese imperial reforms took their cues both from

⁷¹ Similarly, in other non-Western contexts, the “emergence of police was—in some senses—an outgrowth not only of the centralization of state and the production of modern individualized ‘subjects,’ but also a result of activism by social reformers who saw a more lawfully institutionalized criminal justice system as bulwarks against arbitrary punishment and spectacles of torture and brutality.” Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler, “Introduction,” in Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler, eds., *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East: Formations of Coercion* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 4.

endogenous, historical repertoires and European security practices. In this sense, Japan was no different from the broader patterns of colonial and imperial policing, which varied significantly across contexts.⁷² Also consistent with the general concern, in terms of the development of imperial security cultures in the nineteenth century and the newly emerging role of the police in this, was the Japanese emphasis on the protection of property, maintaining social order and political surveillance against imperial threats, rather than the prevention of crime.

⁷² David M. Anderson and David Killingray, "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940," in David Anderson and David Killingray, eds., *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 3-6.

TABLES

Table 1. Expansion of the Keishichō, 1911-1925

	Keishi	Keibu	Keibuchō	Junsa	Total
1911	44	126	159	5049	5378
1912	42	128	159	5055	5384
1913	46	114	158	5470	5788
1914	45	108	159	5099	5411
1915	47	106	169	5397	5719
1916	47	108	171	5488	5814
1917	48	116	172	5491	5827
1918	49	113	324	8359	8845
1919	52	151	411	8091	8705
1920	52	156	418	7927	8553
1921	54	165	448	9302	9969
1922	54	159	491	9811	10515
1923	64	194	583	11532	12373
1924	60	155	596	11449	12260
1925	60	153	594	11493	12300

Source: Hee-jung Yun, “Geundae Ilbon ui gyeongchal jōjik e gwan han yeoksajeok gochal: 1860-1945” [Historical Review of the Police Organization in Modern Japan between 1860 and 1945], *Gyeongchalhak nonchong* [Police Studies Review] 4, 1 (2009): 167.

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