"The Indo-Pacific as Japan’s 21st Century Grand Strategy" (Saori Katada)
By Sophie Welsh
Saori Katada seminar, titled “The Indo-Pacific as Japan’s 21st Century Grand Strategy,” was based on chapters of a book project with Kei Koga (Nanyang Technological University), tentatively titled Japan’s Grand Strategy: Theory and Framework. The book analyzes the internal and external conditions that have triggered changes in Japan’s grand strategy during critical junctures since the mid-19th century. Katada and Koga envision grand strategy as being defined by a state plan or set of practices to use available resources to achieve national goals. They argue that policy shifts occur as a result of two factors: presence of an external trigger faced by decision-makers (a necessary condition), and a domestic political environment or institutional setting permissive of change (a sufficient condition). The two factors together lead to a critical juncture and a change in grand strategy.
In the last two decades, Japan’s grand strategy has shifted in response to the evolving power dynamics and geopolitical landscape. In historical terms, Japan’s focus was on catching up economically after its period of diplomatic isolation (sakoku) and building up its military power, and as it responded to external shocks to preserve its sovereignty. In the interwar period, we observed a shift from the Shidehara Diplomacy (which followed the emerging international norm and practiced a liberal foreign policy focused on economic advancement) to revisionism. During the Cold War era, Japan shifted to the Yoshida Doctrine, which emphasized postwar economic recovery, minimal defense spending, and a reliance on the U.S. for its own defense.
The post-Cold War phase saw the gradual emergence of an Indo-Pacific grand strategy, which has been consolidated and refined in the 2010s and the current decade. The focus during this period has been on regional institution-building based on the principle of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” Several post-Cold War external shocks required that Japan shift its grand strategy, which included the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the rise of China, relative decline of Western powers, the US retreat from multilateralism, and rising demand for public goods such as free trade and freedom of navigation due to globalization. Simultaneously, changes in Japan’s domestic institutions provided the conditions allowing policy changes, as seen in enhanced political leadership made possible under the Prime Minister’s Office, and Prime Ministers with longer tenures, most notably former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
In response, Japan began to change its strategy, departing from the Yoshida Doctrine and energizing its efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi took steps to build multilateral cooperation through ASEAN + 6. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was invoked in Japan’s response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. Former Prime Minister Abe announced the FOIP in 2016 at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). The first Quad summit was held in 2021. In 2023, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced more concrete plans to actualize the Japanese government’s vision of FOIP.
The FOIP’s three pillars call for the promotion of the rule of law, the pursuit of economic prosperity, and a commitment to peace and stability in the region. In practice, states in the Indo-Pacific region would pursue these goals by a combination of economic and security instruments, by addressing policy agendas such as supply chain resilience, quality infrastructure, and maritime security and freedom of navigation.
A key component of Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy is coalition building, and it has been making strides on regional mega-trade agreements. On that front, the successful formation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) was the most notable accomplishment, as Japan took a leading role in bringing that agreement to fruition. Japan’s ongoing efforts in economic coalition-building include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
In the Q&A session, Katada elaborated further on the internal conditions which gave rise to the Indo-Pacific grand strategy. Former Prime Minister Abe had tried to effect a change during his first premiership (2006-07), but without success until domestic conditions finally allowed it when he became Prime Minister again (2013-20). Katada also discussed the respective roles of the United States, Japan, and multilateral institutions within the Indo-Pacific.